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TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS.I Edited by Paul Finkelman2 and Ste-
phen E. Gottlieb.3 Athens: University of Georgia Press. 
1991. Pp. xi, 448. $45.00. 
John V. Orth 4 
Reviewing a collection of essays is a challenging task; review-
ing essays about state constitutions when the reviewer is thoroughly 
familiar with the text and history of only one state constitution is 
even more challenging. The fifteen essays in this collection (not 
counting the editors' introduction) cover a wide array of topics, 
ranging chronologically over the two centuries of American history. 
Half the essays treat their chosen topics throughout the several 
states, while half focus, more or less exclusively, on the experience 
of a single state; the geographic bias, as always it seems, favors the 
East: two essays on Virginia, two on New York and two on Con-
necticut.s All are well written; individually interesting, they unite 
to form a provocative whole. The editors, organizers of the confer-
ence for which the papers were originally prepared, are to be con-
gratulated. Rather than try to do justice to each of the essays, I 
propose in this review to comment on several themes which are (or 
ought to be) central to the subject. 
1. This collection consists of the following essays: Donald S. Lutz, Political Participa-
tion in Eighteenth-Century America; James A. Henretta, The Rise and Decline of "Demo-
erotic-Republicanism": Political Rights in New York and the Several States, 1800-1915; Peter 
S. Onuf, State Politics and Republican Virtue: Religion, Education, and Morality in Early 
American Federalism; Thomas James, Rights of Conscience and State School Systems in Nine-
teenth-Century America; Morton I. Horwitz, Republican Origins of Constitutionalism; 
Suzanna Sherry, The Early Virginia Tradition of Extrotextua/ Interpretation; Ellen A. Peters, 
Common Law Antecedents of Constitutional Law in Connecticut; H. Jefferson Powell, The 
Uses of State Constitutional History: A Case Note; I. Morgan Kousser, Before Plessy. Before 
Brown: The Development of the Law of Racial Integration in Louisiana and Kansas; Law-
rence M. Friedman, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice in the Late Nineteenth Century; 
Burt Neubome, The Search for a Usable Present; Mary L. Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth 
Control in the Connecticut Supreme Court Before Griswold v. Connecticut; Charles J. Ogle-
tree, Supreme Court Jury Discrimination Cases and State Court Compliance, Resistance, and 
Innovation; William M. Wiecek, State Protection of Personal Liberty: Remembering the Fu-
ture; Kermit L. Hall, Mostly Anchor and Little Sail: The Evolution of American State 
Constitutions. 
2. Visiting Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School. 
3. Professor, Albany Law School. 
4. Graham Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
Author of The North Carolina State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Greenwood Press, 
scheduled for 1993). 
S. The geographical focus of several essays appears in their titles. In two cases the 
focus appears in the text: H. Jefferson Powell's "case note" concerns a Virginia case, Kamper 
v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (IVa. Cas.) 20 (1794), and Wiliiam M. Wiecek concentrates on New York. 
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State constitutions are now in the limelight. For better or 
worse, they were dramatically called to center stage by Justice Wil-
liam J. Brennan in a famous article in 1977, published in the 
Harvard Law Review.6 Disappointed by defeats on the United 
States Supreme Court under Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Jus-
tice Brennan invoked state constitutions in aid of individual rights. 
The Chief Justice retorted with a fervent prayer that state courts 
not mimic what were to him the excesses perpetrated by the Court 
under his predecessor, Chief Justice Earl Warren.7 What had been 
the sleepy preserve of a few state lawyers and eccentric academics 
soon became a sharply politicized discipline. Sounds of the political 
clash are occasionally audible in these essays, although in most 
cases only as "noises off." 
The cause of the commotion, as everyone knows, is that state 
constitutions contain many of the same promising generalities as 
the federal Constitution. Indeed, the federal Bill of Rights copied 
many of the provisions in prior state bills of rights or, as they were 
then more commonly called, "declarations of rights." Although the 
essayists regularly recognize this fact, they treat it as un-
problematic. To a late eighteenth century lawyer, familiar with 
both the federal Bill of Rights and state declarations of rights, one 
suggestive difference was, however, immediately noticeable: while 
the federal Bill of Rights was in the form of an appendix tacked 
onto the original document, the state declarations of rights pre-
ceded the constitutional text. The North Carolina Declaration of 
Rights, for example, was adopted the day before the Constitution, 
the latter incorporating the former by reference.s Logically as well 
as chronologically prior, the Declaration of Rights contained, in ad-
dition to the prized guarantees of individual liberty, a set of princi-
ples to inspire and explain the subsequent details of governmental 
arrangements. For instance, the Declaration of Rights leads off 
with the general principle of popular sovereignty, "That all political 
Power is vested in and derived from the People only,"9 then pro-
ceeds to the local application of that general principle, "That the 
People of this State ought to have the sole and exclusive Right of 
6. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977). 
7. Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
8. The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted on behalf of the people by 
the Fifth Provincial Congress on December 17, 1776. William L. Saunders, ed., 10 The Colo-
nial Records of North Carolina 973 (1890). The North Carolina Constitution was adopted on 
December 18, 1776. Id. at 974. It provided "That the Declaration of Rights is hereby de-
clared to be Part of the Constitution of this State, and ought never to be violated on any 
Pretence whatever." N.C. Const. of 1776, § 44. 
9. N.C. Const. of 1776, Declaration of Rights,§ I. 
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regulating the internal Government and Police thereof." 10 There 
follow (among other general principles) declarations in favor of sep-
aration of powers and frequent elections. The constitutional text 
implements these principles by providing for direct annual elections 
of state senators and representatives and indirect elections of execu-
tive officers and judges. Mter spelling out the principles on which 
the new governmental machinery should be erected, the Declara-
tion of Rights then proclaims principles of individual liberty (free-
dom of the press, right of assembly, religious liberty), as well as the 
now familiar code of criminal procedure. Attention to the structure 
of early declarations of rights like North Carolina's casts new light 
on the relationship between self-government and individual rights. 
I 
To Burt Neuborne, whose essay is written from the perspective 
of a "civil liberties lawyer," the past is familiar country: the Revo-
lutionary elite was imbued with the values of eighteenth-century 
philosophy, which "resonate well with the notion of individual 
rights." To historian Donald S. Lutz, the past is a different coun-
try: "Bills of rights ... were viewed as providing a statement of 
broad principles rather than a set of legally enforceable rights." 
Lutz vouches in evidence the frequent usage in the first declarations 
of rights of "admonitory language" like should and ought, rather 
than what he calls "legally binding" language like shall and will. 
Differing with Neuborne, Lutz contends that state courts "did not 
actively protect these rights in any substantive sense." Apparently 
conceding Lutz's point, Connecticut Chief Justice Ellen A. Peters 
tries to find her way back to familiar terrain by relying on tradi-
tional common law safeguards of individual rights, while Suzanna 
Sherry, recognizing the structural divide between declarations of 
rights and constitutional texts, focuses on the safeguards of individ-
ual rights in the former and the purely institutional arrangements in 
the latter. Sherry observes: "In cases involving individual rights, 
the natural law component was usually dominant. In cases involv-
ing the structure of government, however, the written constitution 
was often more decisive." These comments, then, imply three di-
chotomies, familiar today but far less so the century before last: (1) 
ought as opposed to shall, (2) natural and common law-the two 
were related-as opposed to written constitutions, and (3) declara-
tions or bills of rights as opposed to other constitutional provisions. 
With regard to the first, it may be observed that legal usage in 
10. Id. § 2. 
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the late eighteenth century had not settled down in the matter of 
ought and shall. The North Carolina Declaration of Rights, for ex-
ample, in successive sections declares "That Elections of Members 
to serve as Representatives in General Assembly ought to be free"tt 
and "That in all criminal Prosecutions every Man has a Right to be 
informed of the Accusation against him, and to confront the Accus-
ers and Witnesses with other Testimony, and shall not be compelled 
to give Evidence against himself."t2 It is hard to believe that the 
drafters thought they had crossed the line between admonition and 
command. In this context, it is worth noting that the wording of 
the North Carolina declaration in favor of free elections closely fol-
lows that of the comparable section of the Virginia Declaration of 
Rightst3 and that both clearly derive from the English Declaration 
of Rights (1689): "That Elections of Members of Parliament ought 
to be free."t4 Certain expressions become stereotyped by use, like 
the bad Latin of the phrase ex post facto. In any event, commands 
to the sovereign may be more politely phrased but are commands 
nonetheless, just as a hostage with a gun to his head is coerced 
whether or not the gunman says please and thank you. (For centu-
ries English subjects initiated suits against the Crown in the polite 
form of the "petition of right" rather than with the usual process.) 
After all, what makes the word shall a word to conjure with is only 
that the judges have decided it shall be so. In North Carolina the 
177 6 Declaration of Rights was carried forward verbatim (including 
ought and shall) in the 1868 Constitution, where it appeared as Ar-
ticle I. In 1971 it was again brought forward in the state's third 
Constitution, although this time ought was throughout replaced 
with shall. By the twentieth century it was plain that the change 
made no difference; indeed, the failure to make it in 1868 had made 
no difference. 
The dichotomy between constitutions and other sources of law, 
be they common or natural law, is certainly clearer now than it was 
two centuries ago. When Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. 
Madison struck down the offending sentence in the Judiciary Act of 
1789, he roundly declared that "a law repugnant to the constitution 
II. ld. § 6 (emphasis added). 
12. ld. § 7 (emphasis added). 
13. Va. Const. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 6. Although the North Carolina Dec· 
laration of Rights is used for exemplary purposes in this review, much that is said of it could 
also be said of the Virginia, Maryland and (to some degree) Pennsylvania Declarations of 
Rights. For a tabular comparison of the North Carolina Declaration of Rights with the other 
three, see John V. Orth, North Carolina Constitutional History, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1759, 1797· 
1802 (1992). 
14. The Declaration of Rights, § 8 (1689), in Lois G. Schwoerer, The Declaration of 
Rights, 1689 297 (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1981). 
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is void," meaning, of course, a law repugnant to the United States 
Constitution is void.1s Yet Marshall was only restating an idea 
from the celebrated 1610 English case involving Dr. Bonham, in 
which the supreme law referred to was a medieval amalgam of com-
mon and natural law, with popular ideas of fair play mixed in.l6 
Judges, like other human beings, necessarily understand the present 
in terms of the past, and they require at least as much time as any-
body else to recognize something decidedly new. Like John Mar-
shall, state judges naturally understood the newfangled declarations 
of rights in terms familiar to them from prior experience of English 
common law. (The same "time lag" occurred in the 1870s and 
1880s as a generation of United States Supreme Court Justices read 
the Reconstruction Amendments in light of their pre-Civil Warun-
derstandings of federalism.) 
Just as ought and shall could not be sharply distinguished in 
the late eighteenth century, and just as the modern positivistic con-
cept of the constitution had barely emerged from the welter of other 
constitutional sources, so too the declaration or bill of rights was 
not yet sharply set off from the rest of the Constitution. The draft-
ers were not conscious of a discontinuity when they passed from the 
declaration of principles of self-government to the declaration of 
principles of individual rights. The foremost guarantee of liberty 
was to be representative government itself. Today, especially for 
those believers in individual liberty who put their faith in elite, insu-
lated, countermajoritarian institutions like the judiciary and who 
see the people as the major threat to liberty, the original declara-
tions of rights with their mixture of institutional and libertarian fea-
tures seem a hopeless hodge-podge. The Founders saw it otherwise. 
Of course, when one came to ask just how separate the sepa-
rated powers had to be or how frequent the "frequent elections," 
one looked to the specific provisions in the Constitution, not to the 
general principles in the Declaration of Rights. But then, one did 
the same thing when one sought specific content for the declaration 
of religious liberty: the text of the North Carolina Constitution 
made plain it prohibited an established church but not a religious 
test for office.11 And so mutatis mutandis with other rights. "That 
every Freeman restrained of his Liberty is entitled to a Remedy, to 
enquire into the Lawfulness thereof, and to remove the same if un-
lawful, and that such Remedy ought not to be denied or delayed."1s 
15. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). 
16. Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (1610). 
17. N.C. Const. of 1776, §§ 32, 34. 
18. N.C. Const. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 13. 
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The obvious reference here was "extratextual": the Habeas Corpus 
Act of 1679, received as part ofthe state's common law.t9 The Dec-
laration of Rights declared generally "That Perpetuities and Mo-
nopolies are contrary to the Genius of a free State, and ought not to 
be allowed"2o; the Constitution specifically required "That the fu-
ture Legislature of this State shall regulate Entails in such a Manner 
as to prevent Perpetuities. "21 Finally the General Assembly did its 
duty and adopted the original of the statute still in force.22 In cases 
without constitutional or statutory text, including the right of free 
speech and the guarantee against double jeopardy, one looked to the 
glorious grab-bag of the common law. After all, no one ever said 
the Constitution plus its associated Declaration of Rights created 
the essential rights of popular sovereignty and individual liberty; 
they only declared (some of) them and made them operational. 
After so promising a start, where did the state declarations of 
rights go? By and large, they proved more durable than the institu-
tional arrangements and are still operational. In North Carolina, 
for example, while the Revolutionary Declaration of Rights was 
carried forward in 1868 (with a few additions made necessary by 
defeat in the Civil War), the machinery of government was radically 
redesigned, including among other things the direct election of 
judges.23 Part of the problem from the modem libertarian perspec-
tive is that state courts pursued their own understandings of civil 
rights, not those of twentieth century liberals, tolerating racial seg-
regation, for example, and pioneering concepts of substantive due 
process. This means their set of values was "conservative," at least 
by the lights of Burt Neubome, to whom "conservative means that 
wealthy people like it and poor people do not" -a candid but crude 
definition that, by the way, assumes a unity of interest on each side 
of the economic divide that was usually lacking. 
II 
Increasingly, after the Civil War, state jurisprudence was 
eclipsed by federal. And by the tum of the century, powerful ho-
mogenizing forces were at work in the legal profession, not least the 
19. See "Report of the Commissioners Appointed by an Act of the Legislature of 1817, 
To Revise the Laws of North-Carolina," in Henry Potter, ed., I Laws of North Carolina v-vi 
(1821). 
20. N.C. Const. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 23. 
21. N.C. Const. of 1776, § 43. 
22. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-1 (1984). For the history of this statute, see John V. Orth, 
Does the Fee Tail Exist in North Carolina?, 23 Wake Forest L. Rev. 767 (1988). 
23. For an edited transcript of the relevant debates from the 1868 Constitutional Con-
vention, see John V. Orth, Tuesday, February 11, 1868: The Day North Carolina Chose Direct 
Election of Judges, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1825 (1992). 
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new model law school created by Dean C.C. Langdell at Harvard. 
In his essay, Lawrence M. Friedman recognizes in passing the im-
pact of legal education: "Law schools were generally concerned 
with 'legal science'; their prestige depended on their national rather 
than their local status; state constitutional law was irrelevant to 
their central concerns." Second only to the Supreme Court and the 
Supremacy Clause, "national" law schools ensured the primacy of 
federal law and legal institutions. No one should underestimate the 
extent to which local legal elites were reoriented by their legal edu-
cation. Discussing a sentence from perhaps North Carolina's most 
famous constitutional decision, Bayard v. Singleton,24 an early ex-
ample of judicial review, the North Carolina Supreme Court in 
1982 mistook clear references to the state and its constitution for 
references to the federal union and Constitution. When Judge Sa-
muel Ashe, one of the drafters of the North Carolina Declaration of 
Rights and Constitution, wrote in 1786 "the people of this country, 
with a general union of sentiment, by their delegates, met in Con-
gress, and formed that system of those fundamental principles com-
prised in the Constitution,"2s he meant, of course, by "country" 
North Carolina and by "Congress" the Fifth Provincial Congress. 
The state Supreme Court in the late twentieth century thought he 
was "obviously referring to our national govemment,"26 so com-
pletely had traditions of localism and "state sovereignty" been ef-
faced, even south of the Mason-Dixon line. 
Legal education not only contributed to the decline of state 
constitutions, it remains a formidable barrier to their future devel-
opment. State constitutions simply do not fit into the categories of 
modem law schools. Although logically part of the subject Consti-
tutional Law, they find no room in the course of that name, not 
only because of its national focus but also because they do not lend 
themselves to the summary treatment appropriate to their 
subordinate status. Unlike partnership law, quickly reviewed by 
way of the Uniform Partnership Act at the beginning of the course 
on Business Associations, state constitutional law is too unwieldly 
for similar treatment. Nor do they lend themselves to the common 
law theme-and-variation approach used in the Property course, 
although they share the jurisdictional specificity of land law. If only 
intractable local traditions and vested interests had yielded grace-
fully to the blandishments of the Model State Constitution, legal 
24. I N.C. (I Mart.) 42 (1787). 
25. ld. at 43. 
26. State ex rei. Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 599, 286 S.E.2d 79, 84 (1982). For a 
detailed discussion of this and other historical errors in that case, see John V. Orth, "Forever 
Separate and Distinct':· Separation of Powers in North Carolina. 62 N.C. L. Rev. I (1983). 
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pedagogues would have long ago rescued state constitutional law 
from obscurity! 
III 
The search for a "usable past" can make historians queasy. In 
his essay, William M. Wiecek says flatly that "history cannot be 
used" and finds its "principal lesson" to be banal: "things did not 
have to tum out the way they did"-a point with which I must 
agree, having just said much the same thing myself.27 Yet H. Jeffer-
son Powell is probably right to observe that "history is to be used" 
and to insist on its responsible use: "Ransacking the past for iso-
lated 'good quotes' is bad history and bad law (although, of course, 
at times politically effective)." 
Politics, as we know, is what sparked the recent interest in 
state constitutions. Burt Neubome, the "ACLU lawyer," is candid 
about his objective and uncertain only about the proper metaphor, 
economic or military: he aims "to open up a second market or a 
second front in the enforcement of individual rights." State consti-
tutions are decidedly second best; federal court enforcement of fed-
eral constitutional norms remains the "strategy of first choice." 
Neubome waxes nostalgic for the good old days, when he appeared 
before federal judges whom he found to be "smarter" than their 
state counterparts and "much more elite." The federal court sys-
tem offers "the most insulated forum possible," insulated, that is, 
from the non-elite. This is necessary because Neubome's causes are 
unpopular; his norms frankly "countermajoritarian." Elections are 
the thing to be feared: "an angry populace" turned the enlightened 
California Supreme Court out of office. Fortunately, state supreme 
courts are now "less majoritarian than they used to be," thanks to 
the movement toward appointments or a "formal election process 
that is not particularly threatening to the judges." 
Popular sovereignty, seen from this perspective, is the enemy. 
Far from being the first right in the Declaration of Rights, it now 
appears antithetical. Only a person without historical sense can fail 
to see the ironical similarity between such a viewpoint and that of 
England's colonial governors: not yet having learned to call them-
selves countermajoritarians, they styled themselves simply the "bet-
ter sort." Their ideological heirs in the nineteenth century, as 
documented in James A. Henretta's essay, called more candidly for 
a restricted franchise. This is not, of course, to say that judges 
27. John V. Orth, Thinking About Law Historically: Why Bother?, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 287 
(1991). 
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ought to be chosen in partisan elections (as they are in North Caro-
lina), nor is it to say that individual rights should be at the mercy of 
plebiscites. It is simply to observe that even Federalists like Alexan-
der Hamilton, smarter and much more elite than anybody else, real-
ized that they had somehow to square liberty with popular rule: 
they appealed from the people angry to the people calm. Constitu-
tions are the higher law precisely because they are the majority's 
considered opinion. 
REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACfiON BABY. 
By Stephen L. Carter.' New York: Basic Books. 1991. Pp. 
xiii, 286. Cloth, $23.00. 
Daniel R. Ortiz 2 
Despite its press, this is not really a book about affirmative ac-
tion. To be sure, it swipes at the various arguments used to justify 
affirmative action programs, challenges many orthodoxies and ar-
gues for a major overhauling of racial preferences, but its real con-
cern lies elsewhere-in the contemporary politics of African-
American identity. Racial preferences may have sparked these re-
flections, but racial identity remains the focus of their true concern. 
To understand this, however, discussion must begin with Carter's 
ostensible subject: affirmative action. 
Carter takes on both the "traditional" and "modern" ap-
proaches to racial preferences, by which he means the remedial and 
diversity justifications, respectively. Although both approaches ac-
tually have a long history in the debate and can, for example, be 
found in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,3 it is true 
that the diversity rationale, the "modern" approach, has enjoyed 
increasing prominence with the advent of critical race studies.4 The 
more "traditional" approach captures little of Carter's interest and 
he dispatches it quickly. 
Against those who believe that racial preferences are permissi-
ble and sometimes even necessary to remedy racial oppression, 
Carter makes three primary arguments. First, he notes that racial 
oppression has not harmed all African-Americans the same way. 
I. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University. 
2. Professor of Law and Harrison Foundation Research Professor, University of 
Virginia. 
3. 438 u.s. 265 (1978). 
4. See Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal 
Academia, 1990 Duke L.J. 705. 
